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Abstract: This paper tries to explain the curious fact that while at the
national level the rural sector saves more than what it invests in itself
in India, at the micro level, credit constraint is reported to be the
main binding constraint on the activities in the rural economy. The
explanation lies in the phenomenon of coordination failure. The public sector rural banks mobilize huge amounts of savings, but because
of low rates of interest and high default rates, they do not lend in
equal measure. Indeed, in India the public sector rural banks mobilize
as savings three times the amount they lend as credit for investment.
Raising the rate of interest at which the rural banks lend will not
only raise the savings but also the investment in the rural sector. This
is because at the current low level of rate of interest the rural credit
market is severaly rationed. As the rate of interest is allowed to rise
more banks become viable, banks increse their lending, more people
are brought into the ambit of rural banks and away from the money
lender. The poor especially benefit as this increased rate of interest is
still only half the rate of interest that the moneylender charges.The
policy suggestion is to allow the public sector rural banks to charge
economically viable and market clearing rates of interest.

Introduction
An emerging stylized fact about rural credit markets worldwide
is that with the introduction of development financial institutions (DFI), not only do savings go up with an increase in the
rate of interest, so does investment (Mosley and Hulme, 1996,
vol. II; see different chapters for different countries). This paper
attempts to explain this phenomenon. The explanation lies in the
phenomenon of coordination failure in the rural credit markets.
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It is well known that the spread of formal banking in rural
areas has not succeeded in driving out the moneylender from the
rural credit market (Mosley, 1996). Instead, moneylenders continue to thrive—partly because of the special kind of credit needs
they respond to, which the formal sector does not, and partly
because of the transaction cost advantages that a moneylender
has in comparison to those of the formal sector bank (Eswaran
& Kotwal, 1989). Were it the case that the impact of formal sector banking was merely to replace the moneylenders’ business,
there would have been little to recommend it; with the constant
support required in the form of subsidy in the face of mounting
losses, it would have been correctly looked at as a burden on the
rest of the economy. However, to the extent that the rural
banks have done more than merely replace the moneylenders’
business, it hints at the presence of coordination failure possibilities: This is because out of the same total income, there are
two or more levels of savings and investment, and state action
can lift the economy to the higher equilibria. Since most of the
rural banking is under the public sector, we intend to say something on this aspect of the public sector role and performance.
In what follows we first demonstrate the theoretical possibility of coordination failure in the rural credit sector. We
then look at the analytics of such a possibility and derive the
conditions of coordination failure in the rural credit sector.
Finally we consider some innovations in the public sector’s
role in the rural credit sector.
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Rural Credit: Ground Realities
Although different rural areas do differ in the credit institutions
they have, we will work with the following stylized facts about
rural credit:
1. The dominant player in the rural credit market is the rural
bank. It mobilizes more savings from the rural sector than it
disburses in it.
2. Rural banks have not been able to replace the moneylender.
If anything, moneylenders are thriving.
3. Rural banks charge low rates of interest but have high transaction costs.
4. Moneylenders charge high rates of interest but have low
transaction costs.
5. Rural banks have a high default ratio, whereas the moneylenders have a low default ratio.
6. Rural banks lend only for production purposes (though only
a part of lent money ends up as productive), whereas moneylenders lend both for consumption as well as for production
purposes.
The rural banking system in India mobilizes more savings
from the rural sector than it disburses as loans in this sector
(Mosley, 1996). So while the rural banks have to some extent
replaced the moneylender, they have also performed an entirely
new function which the moneylender was not performing—that
is, savings mobilization. In principle this too can leave the situation entirely unchanged if the people who save are also the
people who invest (treating the bank as a safe deposit), but to
the extent that the banks, by mobilizing savings, channel
investible surplus from net savers to net borrowers, they perform a heretofore unperformed activity—and therein lies
another possible source of coordination failure.
However, most rural banks suffer from a very high rate of
default in loan repayment, which has caused most of these banks
to go in the red; sometimes their default rate is so high that their
entire net worth has been wiped off (Mosley, 1996). Yet none of
these banks have been shut down as they continue to mobilize
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impressive amounts of savings. Thus, while on the one hand
they continue to lose sometimes up to 85% of their advances in
defaults, they also continue to mobilize substantial amounts of
savings. This situation would not have been possible without
the state standing behind them to write off all bad debt and continue to subsidize rural credit. If these banks had to depend for
their viability entirely on their deposits and profitable advances,
most of them would have long since gone under—or else they
would have had to take on some of the features of the more successful rural banks, that is, higher rate of interest, higher administration expenditure on collection, higher incentive for
repayment, etc. That they continue to exist with continuous
loss-making subsidized credit advances opens up another possibility of coordination failure

What Is a Coordination Failure?
Coordination failures are situations in which agents fail to
coordinate their decisions to arrive at a mutually beneficial
state of affairs. This failure to coordinate occurs because
under the current state of affairs, no individual agent has the
incentive to make a decision that would bring all of them to
a better state of affairs. On the other hand, if all of them
made the decision simultaneously, a better state of affairs
would result. Thus in a given situation, “while the rate of
return to coordinated investment may be extremely high, the
rate of return to individual investment may be low” (Rodrik,
1995, p. 78). At a given level of capital stock it may not be
meaningful to talk about marginal productivity of capital,
since the marginal productivity of capital at a certain level of
stock now has a range of values that depends on the level of
coordination in the rest of the economy. Instead of working
with a continuum of coordination possibilities, we will think
of a discrete number of coordination possibilities.
The classic case of coordination failure was that of demand
externality. Underdeveloped countries are underdeveloped
because of small markets for goods, so no single sector can
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expand their output. However, if all sectors expanded output
simultaneously, they would create demand for each other and
thus make viable the higher level of output in all sectors. The fact
that the economy could simultaneously sustain more than one
equilibria, that they could be ranked, and that when the economy is trapped in the low equilibrium, no agent independently
has the incentive to move to the higher equilibrium, whereas a
coordinated movement would lift the economy to the higher
equilibria—all characterize the existence of coordination failure.

Discussion
The low rates of interest charged by rural banks results in
excess demand, and because the rates of interest are fixed, into
rationing (Braverman & Guasch, 1989). Since only relatively
rich people can provide the collateral, the poor are rationed
out. People whose loan demand is not satisfied then turn to the
moneylender, whose rate of interest further rises in response to
this excess demand.
Thus we have two rates of interest in the rural sector: r
charged by the bank, and R charged by the moneylender (R is
greater than r). This means that there is a whole range of economic opportunities which promise an expected rate of return
between r and R and which are not undertaken for lack of funds.
The rural bank suffers from three problems in its lending
activity: it may choose wrong projects to fund because of
inadequate information (adverse selection), its employees may
cheat the bank by deliberately choosing wrong projects
(moral hazard) for private gain, or employees may not have
enough incentive to enforce repayment.
It is important to realize that the fact that the rural bank
has a high default rate is not just a matter of public sector
inefficiency. A private sector monopoly would also suffer
from similar defaults even if it covered costs by charging
higher interest. So merely allowing the rural bank to charge a
higher rate of interest may allow it to cover costs, but it will
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leave the essential problem of information asymmetry unaddressed and thus leave the inefficiency aspects unresolved.
Hypothesis: We claim that the fact that rural banks mobilize
an amount of savings that is more than what it disburses, combined
with the general shortage of credit availability (as seen when private moneylenders not only charge a higher rate of interest but also
have a low level of default), suggests the presence of coordination
failure. Suitable policy design can lead to a higher share of rural
savings going to rural investment.
It must be pointed out that this coordination failure is not
policy-induced. In the absence of government intervention, the
equilibrium is unique to low savings and low investment.

Analysis
In Figures 1 and 2 we show the time profile of the formal and
informal sector credit availability. We see that what is true at
one point of time is not true over a period of time. Consider
first Figure 1. Here the interest rate in the formal sector is set
at less than the break-even rate; i.e., the formal sector banking
is subsidized. While it may be advantageous to the rural sector
in the short run, we see that the loan availability itself goes
down over the long run because the system is not generating
surplus. And as the formal sector loan availability goes down,
the availability goes up in the informal sector because of the
surplus generated in the sector. On the other hand, in Figure 2
the formal sector interest rate is set at or above the break-even
rate. Here we see that in the short run, while the rural sector
has to bear a higher rate of interest, in the long run this makes
for a higher loan availability in the rural sector. Thus subsidy,
if not supported from the outside, does not automatically benefit the target group. In the current scenario of economic
reforms and fiscal austerity, where all sorts of subsidies are
being pruned (in the annual budget of the Government of India
in 1997–98, the subsidy was sought to be brought down by
half), it is important to recognize these facts.
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In Figure 3a and Figure 3b we show the same phenomenon
in terms of its impact not on the volume of loan availability
but on the rate of interest. Consider first Figure 3a. The formal
sector supply curve is perfectly elastic at the rate of interest r o ,
which is less than the break-even rate and also the market
clearing equilibrium rate. The corresponding situation in the
informal sector (Figure 3b) shows a comparatively inelastic
supply curve intersecting the demand curve at a higher rate of
interest. In Figure 4a we begin in the formal sector with the
surplus generating rate of interest r 3 . This, over time, shifts the
supply curve to the right, and the market clearing rate of interest keeps on falling. The corresponding story in the informal
sector (Figure 4b) is that as loan availability increases in the
formal sector, fewer and fewer people are required to resort to
the informal sector, so that the demand curve keeps on shifting
leftwards and downwards because of which the rate of interest
in the informal sector keeps on falling. In Figures 5a, 5b, and
5c we bring the insights of the above two to generate the possibility of coordination failure.
In Figure 5a the backward bending curve shows that the
investment in the formal sector first increases with the rate of
interest and then declines. This is because as the formal sector
rate of interest rises, loan availability increases; and as the
shorter side of the market rules in disequilibrium (i.e., the formal sector has excess demand at the going rate of interest) total
investment made out of borrowings from the formal sector
increases. But this happens only up to a point, after which the
higher rate of interest compares poorly with the expected rate
of return and the investment demand goes down. Figure 5b has
the same investment curve as in Figure 5a but it has a savings
curve imposed on it. The savings curve completely overlaps the
investment curve up to the point at which the investment
curve starts bending backwards. This is because up to this
point, the savings-investment market was in disequilibrium,
and the law of the shorter side ruling meant that equality
would hold.
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But after a point, while savings continue to rise with the
rate of interest, investment does not. Finally in Figure 5c we
show that in a situation in which both the investment and savings curves are upward sloping, this could generate multiple
equilibria and thus possibilities of coordination failure. In the
next section we see what policy measures this might call for.

Let us now introduce another source of coordination failure, that of moral hazard originating in imperfect information.
In the rural credit market the nature of coordination failure
is as follows: From the same total amount of savings mobilized,
two different levels of economic activity become feasible: one in
which most of the loan is dispersed by the formal sector, which
has very poor access to information and thus works with poor
screening, monitoring, and enforcement, and most of the loan
(as much as 85%) ends up in bad debt; and another, in which
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most of the loan is routed through private agents with excellent
local information, who charge higher rates of interest to procure
this information, and the level of default is low. (Indeed, this
fact has recently been recognized in a policy paper of the
Reserve Bank of India, which has asked the rural banks to give
loans to self-help groups.) The fact that from the same level of
aggregate rural savings we can generate two different levels of
entrepreneurship suggests the presence of coordination failure
possibilities. The basis of this coordination failure is in the
imperfect-information nature of rural credit market—procuring
information and transacting in small amounts is costly, and
higher rates of interest are required to cover this cost.
Thus if from the same level of aggregate savings we can generate two different equilibria of rate of interest, we would have
demonstrated another example of coordination failure. Consider now Figure 6, which shows comparison of capabilities in
savings mobilization and productive investment between the
public sector rural bank and the moneylender (in this generic
term we include other private agents, such as traders, etc.).

I S
Moneylender Rural Bank

Rural Bank

Moneylender

I

II

High Savings

Poor Savings

Poor Quality
Investment

Poor Quality
Investment

III

IV

High Savings

Poor Savings

High Quality
Investment

High Quality
Investment

Figure 6. A comparison of saving and investment
capabilities of banks and moneylenders. While banks
are good in saving mobilization, the moneylenders
are not. The opposite is true in investment.
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Box I shows a situation in which both the savings mobilization as well as investment decision are made by the rural
bank. We claim that this will result in high savings but poor
quality of investment, for the above-mentioned reasons. Box II
shows savings mobilization through the moneylender and
investment decision by the bank. This is the worst-case scenario, in which both the activities are performed at the low
level. This is because moneylenders are poor mobilizers of savings, and banks are poor at determining the productivity of
loans. Box III is the best of all possible worlds: where banks
mobilize savings and lend them for investment through some
private route, such as agents. (This system is already in use in
Indonesia. There, moneylenders have been co-opted into the
microfinance program. Thus banks give loans to moneylenders, who pass them on to the end users. The moneylenders
charge a higher rate of interest than what they pay to the bank,
but they also absorb all risk of default (see Mosley & Hulme,
1996, vol. I, p. 74 ). Finally, in Box IV, moneylenders mobilize
savings as well as decide on investment; this gives a low rate of
savings mobilization and a high productivity of investment.
The Indian rural credit market exists in part in Box I and in
part in Box IV. The desired change is in the direction of Box
III: already some distance has been travelled in that direction as
the banks have started giving loans to self-help groups, with
joint liability for repayment and excellent results. Reserve
Bank of India estimates that the repayment rate among these
self-help groups is close to 100%.

Empirical Evidence
The evidence of the claim that at higher rates of interest, both
savings and investments go up comes from diverse countries. In
almost all countries, with the coming into prominence of
microfinance institutions, the rate of interest charged on loans
by the nonmoneylender agencies has gone up, and so has the
level of savings and investment.
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At a theoretical level, evidence that with the arrival of MFIs,
both savings and investment go up at a higher rate of interest is
trivial. Since these institutions are surviving, are mobilizing savings, and are giving credit, they are increasing the volume of
investment taking place in the rural sector. However, both with
regard to net investment and with regard to average rate of
interest (which takes into account the change in the rate of
interest of the moneylenders, with the arrival of the MFIs),
one has to take into account what is happening in other parts
of the rural financial sector. As for net investment, the productive investment component of MFI’s credit does not substitute for the moneylender’s loan, since moneylenders’ loans are
mostly for consumption purposes. Can we still claim that with
the arrival of MFIs the average rate of interest has gone up?
Though there is evidence to the contrary (the moneylenders
reduce their rate of interest with the coming of the MFIs; see
Mosley & Hulme, 1996, vol.II, p. 23), we compare that rate of
interest which is relevant to productive investment. Here, the
only relevant rate of interest to compare with is the bank rate
of interest, since banks are the only alternative source of
finance for investment expenditures in the rural sector. Since
rural banks have not lowered the rate of interest at which they
lend, the average rate of interest for loans for investment purposes has unambiguously gone up.
Since 1983 the Indonesian government has allowed,
and Indonesian financial institutions have taken advantage of, freedom to set their own interest rates. . . . In
the BKK and the KURK systems there are a variety of
loan models, . . . and the nominal monthly interest
rates from 2 percent to 4.8 percent. . . . The effective
rates resulting from the variegated menu offered by the
BKKs and KURKs range from 26 percent to 130
percent. . . . All the institutions studied here have
charged highly positive rates of interest. (Mosley &
Hulme, 1996, vol. II, p. 41)
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In Indonesia, “real interest rates on normal savings deposits
increased from 5.26% in 1982 to 10.7% in 1985, and nationally
savings deposits more than tripled over those same three years
“(Mosley & Hulme, 1996, vol. II, p. 34).
“The BRI voluntary savings schemes have succeeded
beyond all expectations, and as of December 1993 they have
just over 7 million savers and have accumulated Rp. 957 billion
in client savings” (Mosley & Hulme, 1996, vol. II, p. 43).
During the same period, loans for investment increased
from an average of $199 in 1986 to $625 in 1992 (Mosley &
Hulme, 1996, vol. II, p. 48).
In the case of PRODEM/BancoSol, the number of new borrowers increased from 1737 in 1987 to 15,300 in 1994, just as
the average loan size increased from $92 to $361 (Mosley &
Hulme, 1996, vol. II, p. 7) The amount disbursed increased
from $462,000 in 1987 to $24.7 million in 1993. During the
same period, the value of savings increased from zero in 1987 to
over $3 million in 1994. All this took place at an annual rate of
interest of 60% per year (Mosley & Hulme, 1996, vol. II, p. 5).
In Sri Lanka, with the formation of thrift and credit
cooperatives, total deposits increased from $5.5 million in
1981 to $13.5 million in 1992, just as total loans disbursed
increased from $3.3 million in 1981 to $5.5 million in 1992.
SANASA’s savings mobilized went up from Rs. 418 million in
1989 to Rs. 696.8 million in 1992, whereas its advances went
up from Rs. 416 million in 1989 to Rs. 715 million in 1992
(Mosley and Hulme, 1996, vol. II, p. 228). During the same
period, SANASA’s (1992) rate of interest ranged between 20%
and 80% per year.

Policy
The solution to the problem of credit constraints in rural activities lies not in greater resource mobilization but in innovation
in institutional design, since the problem lies in the delivery of
credit rather than in the size of aggregate savings. We have
already identified the institution as the self-help group, an
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association of poor people who save and borrow collectively;
peer monitoring ensures a high rate of repayment of loan. In
Figure 7 as we replace money lenders with self help groups, we
move to Box III where savings are mobilized by the bank but
the investment decision is made by the self help group. This
results both in high savings and high quality investment.

Self-help Group

Rural Bank

I S

Rural Bank
I

Self-help Group
II

High Savings

High Savings

Poor Quality
Investment

Poor Quality
Investment

III

IV

High Savings

High Savings

High Quality
Investment

High Quality
Investment

Figure 7. Policy innovation replaces moneylender
with self-help groups. This is a Pareto improvement
over the earlier situation since we now have both
high savings and more productive investment.

What is clear at the outset is that withdrawal from rural
banking because of losses incurred is undesirable. This is
because even if there were no defaults, the break-even rate of
interest would still have to be twice the rate currently charged.
Thus the losses were, so to speak, planned losses. Indeed, the
coordination failure possibilities in the rural credit market arise
precisely because of the existence of public-sector rural banking. If there were no public-sector rural banks (PSRB), and the
field were left entirely to moneylenders, there would be no
coordination failure: this is because in the absence of a financial
intermediary (no private-sector bank wishes to open branches
in the rural sector, as is evidenced by records before bank
nationalization), savings would not be mobilized from the public (the moneylenders do not have the authority to mobilize
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savings, and in any case they lack credibility), and we are locked
into the low equilibrium, where the moneylender lends from
his own savings. The amount lent and borrowed would be very
small and at a very high rate of interest. This would be a unique
equilibrium, and the economy would be trapped in it, since
there would be nowhere else to go. However, with the presence
of the public sector rural banks (PSRB), the whole situation
changes. This is precisely because of the ability of the public
sector banks to mobilize savings. Even loss-making public sector banks thus open possibilities of multiple equilibria. The aim
of rural banking should be to maximize this saving mobilization
and channel it to the most productive investment in the rural
sector over the long run. This means that the rate of interest
chosen should be the surplus-generating rate of interest, and
in the limiting case, even the market-clearing equilibrium rate
of interest. However, the rate of interest is not the only instrument available with the bank. The other instruments are
• Increased expenditure on loan collection
• Increased incentive on loan repayment
• Increased disincentive on default, in the form of lending to
groups that have peer monitoring
All these will lead to the attainments of the higher equilibrium and provide for a higher rate of investment in the
rural sector.
What is the coordination task of the state? The task
required is precisely to mobilize the savings and channel it to
productive investment. This leads the economy to a higherlevel equilibrium, compared to the situation in which the state
does not intervene. This intervention need not generate loss.
Note, however, that even if the system generates loss, so long as
it generates an amount of savings from the rural sector that is
greater than what it lends to the rural sector, it may even be
worthwhile to maintain the loss-making banking system: this
would depend on how the loss generated on the mobilization of
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the marginal rupee of savings compares with the productivity
of the marginal rupee in the rural or urban sector.

Conclusion
We have seen that the presence of subsidized credit by the public sector banks in the rural credit market creates a possibility
of multiple equilibria with respect to the rate of interest. This
means that when the public-sector rural banks charge low rate
of interest on their loans, they create conditions of excess
demand and thus of rationing. Charging a market-clearing (as
well as surplus-generating) rate of interest results in a rise in
both the savings and the investment levels in the rural sector,
as evidenced by numerous examples. Further, the higher rate
of interest charged by the public sector rural bank is still much
lower than what the moneylenders would charge the rationed
out loanees in the rural sector.

Notes
Numerous studies (e.g., Mosley, P. & Hulme, D. (1996) ibid. Vol II Tables
12.13 and 13.7 ) show that the economically viable rate of interest in the Indian
public-sector rural banks is between 24% and 36% per annum. While this is more
than double the current rate of interest at 14% per annum, it is considerably less
than 5% per month that the moneylenders usually charge. At a simple rate of
interest, it turns out to be 60% per year.
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